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Rule of Law vs. Presidential Power 
The Case of Exculpation Decrees 
RADU CARP 
 
 
 
 
The decrees issued by the President of Romania represent one of the few 
displays of presidential will that possess a legal character. In the same category 
falls the adoption of the Regulation on the organisation and functioning of the 
Presidential Administration, issued according to Art. 2 of the Law no. 47/1994 
concerning the organisation and functioning of the Romanian Presidency1. The 
President may act through material actions with legal character, may carry out ma-
terial operations or may issue exclusively political acts. 
The Romanian doctrine did not pay enough attention to the President’s 
decrees, as administrative acts, because the common practice enjoined no ample 
debates, until the moment when the issuing and the subsequent revoking of a 
presidential decree for exculpation came to the forefront of the public opinion, in 
December 2004. The purpose of this study is to analyse the situation at hand from a 
legal point of view, by reference to the existing norms at that time, as well as by 
reference to the legislation adopted at a later date and the drafts for normative acts, 
which may have an impact on the special category of administrative acts, namely 
the presidential decrees. 
The Romanian Constitution offers only scant details with respect to the 
presidential decrees. Only a general rule is stated according to which the President, 
in the exercise of his duties, may issue decrees. In the reading it was emphasised 
that, from a constitutional point of view, it is unclear exactly when the President 
may use decrees and when must he employ other forms by which he can express 
his will2. There are situations, such as the promulgation of laws, when the 
constitutional involvement of the President can only be made by means of issuing 
decrees. It is stimulating to analyse from a legal point of view the President’s duty, 
described by the Art. 4 of the Law no. 47/1994, to appoint and release from office 
the presidential advisers. This expression of Presidential will, although the law 
gives no clear account, can only be done by means of a legal act. There is no 
                                                
1 Republished in Monitorul Oficial, no. 210 from April 25th 2001, modified by Emergency 
Ordinance no. 176/2001, in Monitorul Oficial, no. 839 from December 27th 2001, approved by Law 
no. 226/2002, in Monitorul Oficial, no. 290 from April 29th 2002. Law no. 47/1994 refers only to the 
”approval” of the respective Regulation by the President, without clarifying what kind of norma-
tive act needs such an operation in order to materialise. We consider that the President cannot 
approve the Regulation on the organisation and functioning of the Presidential Administration by 
means of a presidential decree. This conclusion concurs with an institutional common practice, 
the text of the Regulation is not published in Monitorul Oficial, unlike the presidential decrees for 
which the obligation to be published exists, according to Art. 100 § 1 of the Constitution. On the 
same grounds, the President cannot modify, reject or revoke the respective Regulation through a 
presidential decree.  
2 Tudor DRĂGANU, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice, vol. I, Lumina Lex, Bucureşti, 
1998, p. 281. 
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contradiction to the solution that the President may employ in this situation a legal 
act other than the presidential decree, but the institutional practice demonstrated 
that even in this situation the President would rather issue presidential decrees. 
The clarification must be made that, in what concerns the constitutional provisions, 
the President may issue acts other than decrees, but we join in the opinion that a 
subsequent change of the institutional practice up to this day must be reflected in 
the legislation concerning the organisation and the functioning of the President of 
Romania and of the Presidential Administration. 
The decrees of the President of Romania can be individual or normative. This 
conclusion is almost unanimously shared in the public law literature1. There are 
other authors who consider that the presidential decrees cannot possess a norma-
tive character2. We support the view that the decrees for exculpation are individual 
in character in the sense that, through their issuing, the President cannot give birth 
to legal norms. First of all, it concerns with the situations which have been deliber-
ately described in a general manner by the constitutional authority. Thus, accord-
ing to Art. 92 § 3 of the Constitution ”In the event of an armed aggression against 
the country, the President of Romania shall take measures to repel the aggression”. 
The Constitution makes no clear reference about the kind of actions that can be 
pursued, however it is taken for granted that in extraordinary situations the Presi-
dent is allotted the right to take decisions that would correspond to the gravity of 
the situation and through which he could enjoy the highest possible degree of in-
volvement within the settlement of the dispute. The measures mentioned by the 
constitutional text may take the shape of acts, both individual and normative. De-
claring total or partial mobilisation of the armed forces, a prerogative of the Presi-
dent contained in Art. 99 § 2 of the Constitution, can only be made by means of a 
normative act. By this expression of will the President gives birth to a new legal 
situation, his act being at the origin of the mobilisation of the armed forces. Some 
decrees of the President, like those that involve the application of Art. 99 § 2 of the 
Constitution, enjoy an uncontested normative character as they ”affect large cate-
gories of subjects, and the dispositions they contain have repetitive application”3. 
In what concerns the legal nature of the President’s decrees, the literature 
unanimously admits that these are administrative acts and thus, they can be chal-
lenged in the administrative courts4. Consequently, the decrees for exculpation can 
be challenged in court, this issue however will be dealt with later in this article. 
Art. 100 § 2 of the Constitution requires the countersignature of some of the 
President’s decrees, in this category falling also the exculpation decrees. In connec-
tion with the situation that occurred on December 2004, the acting Prime Minister 
                                                
1 Ion DELEANU, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice, vol. II, Europa Nova, Bucureşti, 1996, 
p. 359; Genoveva VRABIE, Organizarea politico-etatică a României. Drept constituţional şi instituţii po-
litice, Cugetarea, Iaşi, 1996, p. 265; Mircea PREDA, Tratat elementar de drept administrativ român, 
Lumina Lex, Bucureşti, 1996, p. 324; Ioan VIDA, Puterea executivă şi administraţia publică, Regia 
Autonomă ”Monitorul Oficial”, Bucureşti, 1994, p. 68. 
2 Antonie IORGOVAN, Tratat de drept administrativ, vol. I, All-Beck, Bucureşti, 2002, p. 322; 
Dana APOSTOL TOFAN, Drept administrativ, vol. I, All-Beck, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 137; Ioan VIDA, 
op. cit., p. 68; Emil BĂLAN, Drept administrativ şi procedură administrativă, Editura Universitară, 
Bucureşti, 2002, p. 71. 
3 Verginia VEDINAŞ, Drept administrativ şi instituţii politico-administrative, Lumina Lex, Bu-
cureşti, 2002, p. 272. 
4 The opinions expressed by the literature concerning this problem will be dealt with in a 
special section of this article.  
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at the time, Adrian Năstase, initially declared that he did not recall whether he 
countersigned or not Decree no. 1164 from December 15th 20041, and some com-
mentators tried to impose the view that, only by countersigning some acts, there 
can be no complete, political and administrative responsibility for the Prime Minis-
ter due to the consequences of the decree in question. If the Prime Minister’s amne-
sia is grounded only on political motives the second above-mentioned rationale 
may be proved to have no juridical grounds. 
Initially, during the time in which the relations between the powers in the 
state were not rigorously accounted for by normative acts of constitutional char-
acter, it was considered that the head of state is entirely absolved of responsibil-
ity. Thus, Jean Bodin, in The Six Books of the Republic considers that the sovereign 
enjoys almost absolute immunity, having to answer for his acts ”[to] no one, ex-
cept for the God almighty”2. According to Bodin, ”the sovereign doesn’t actually 
fulfil any function, being above all functions his subjects may have”3. Once the 
modern states with a constitutionalised public life appeared, the idea that the 
head of state has no responsibility has been gradually given up, however all 
modern Constitutions guarantee a certain form of immunity for the head of state, 
as a reminder of the period when the responsibility had a privileged regime, in-
tangible, by comparison with the responsibility of other persons that were in 
leadership positions. The Romanian constitutional regime made no exception 
from this general tendency. In the period 1858-1938 it was considered that all the 
acts issued by the head of state must be countersigned either by the Prime Minis-
ter or the minister in charge with the pursuit of the respective act. Even the de-
cree by which a new Prime Minister was appointed had to be countersigned by 
the former Prime Minister4. Only the Prime Minister could be held responsible 
for countersigning acts issued by the king, thus instating the rule of the sover-
eign’s inviolability. The 1866 Constitution stated in Art. 92: ”The Sovereign’s per-
son is inviolable. His ministers are responsible. No act of the Sovereign can hold power 
without being counter-signed by a minister who, in so doing, becomes responsible for 
that act”. The 1923 and 1938 Constitutions adopted these provisions in their en-
tirety in Art. 87 and, respectively, Art. 445. 
In the public debates that surrounded the revoking of Decree no. 1164/2004 it 
was mentioned the existence of an alleged decree issued by King Michael in 1946 
so that those condemned in the ”high national treason” trial, especially Marshall 
Ion Antonescu, could be exculpated, but it was never put in practice due to the an 
inexisting countersignature from the Prime Minister. This historical reference was 
made in order to underline the role of the counter-signature, which is decisive for 
the application of the head of state’s expression of will and to help reveal the con-
sequences of those options that were available to the Prime Minister who held 
office in the first half of December 2004. The example mentioned above has no fac-
tual of legal endorsement: such a royal decree did never exist. 
                                                
1 Monitorul Oficial, no. 1207 from December 16th 2004. 
2 Jean BODIN, Les six livres de la République, Librairie Générale Française, Paris, 1993, p. 111. 
3 Radu CARP, Responsabilitatea ministerială. Studiu de drept public comparat, All-Beck, Bucu-
reşti, 2003, pp. 10-11. 
4 Tudor DRĂGANU, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice, cit., p. 274. 
5 See Ioan MURARU, Gheorghe IANCU, Constituţiile române – Texte. Note. Prezentare compa-
rativă, Regia Autonomă ”Monitorul Oficial”, Bucureşti, 1995; Cristian IONESCU, Dezvoltarea con-
stituţională a României. Acte şi documente – 1741-1991, Lumina Lex, Bucureşti, 1998. 
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Through the ruling from May 17th 1946 of the People’s Tribunal, established by 
Law no. 312/1945, Marshall Ion Antonescu, along with three other accused, were 
condemned to death and other 20 accused received incarceration punishment and 
the complementary penalty of military or civic disgrace. The attorneys of those 
convicted appealed to the High Court of Justice, invoking the unconstitutionality 
of the law according to which the People’s Tribunal was functioning. The appeal 
was however rejected. In the same time these attorneys pleaded with the King Mi-
chael for the issuing of a decree by which the punishment of their convicted clients 
should be reduced1. Since Petru Groza, the acting Prime Minister, opposed King 
Michael could not issue the decree. In exchange for these modified intentions of 
the sovereign the Prime Minister did not oppose to counter-signing another royal 
decree by which the punishment of other former high-ranking officials convicted 
by the People’s Tribunal was reduced (Eugen Cristescu, Radu Lecca). 
This episode show that often times the decrees issued by the head of state are 
the result of a compromise struck with the one who has to countersign the docu-
ment. A previous consultation, at informal level, between the head of state and the Prime 
Minister before the issuing of a decree can only benefit the actual implementation of the 
head of state’s expression of will, albeit without any constitutional obligation in the matter. 
Such a consultation must have been necessary before the issuing of Decree no. 
1164/2004. The Prime Minister might have had the possibility to decline counter-
signing the decree (even at the moment when it was only a draft), which, in turn, 
would have made the decree void of its content. In the period between the 
counter-signing and the revoking of Decree no. 1164/2004 by Decree 1173/2004 
the Prime Minister held the entire responsibility in what concerns all the aspects 
related to the actual application of the first decree. 
The 1991 Constitution is the first fundamental act of the Romanian State, in 
which the rule of countersigning applies only to a certain category of acts issued by 
the head of state. This rule is expressly stated in Art. 100 § 2. For all the other indi-
vidual or normative acts of the President, the countersigning is not a compulsory 
condition for them to produce legal effects. The President’s decrees need not be 
countersigned by the Prime Minister unless the Constitution clearly stipulates it. 
Art. 100 § 2 from the Constitution must be restrictively interpreted and cannot be 
considered as a reference norm2. This leads to the conclusion that the Prime Minis-
ter cannot be compelled by any public authority (the President included) to coun-
tersign decrees other than the ones mentioned in the Constitution. 
The decrees of exculpation fall into the category of presidential administrative 
acts for which the Prime Minister’s countersignature is required, which comes to 
show that exculpation, indifferent to other normative regulations inferior to the 
Constitution or to the fact that the act in question can be censured by administra-
tive courts, is considered as a reminder of the head of state’s absolute inviolability, 
an attribute that under no circumstances can be delegated to other state authorities. 
What are transmitted to the Prime Minister are only the responsibility, and not the 
possibility to issue a similar normative act. The best support to the conclusion that 
only responsibility is transmissible to the Prime Minister in case of exculpation de-
crees is the fact that he has no power over the content of the decree. He cannot 
                                                
1 The 1923 Constitution stated (art. 88) that the king could ease (”reduce”) definitive 
punishments.  
2 Dana APOSTOL TOFAN, op. cit., p. 273. 
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modify or reject it. The Prime Minister has only two options: either to countersign 
it, or to refuse it altogether. 
The responsibility is transmitted to the Prime Minister but only in what con-
cerns the political aspect. Even the transmission of political responsibility is partial, 
inasmuch as nothing can prevent the Parliament from invoking as an excuse for the im-
peachment of the President, according to Art. 95 from the Constitution, the content of a de-
cree, even when it has been countersigned by the Prime Minister. Meanwhile, the 
Parliament can invoke as reason for withdrawing the confidence granted to the Govern-
ment, by means of a motion of censure, adopted under the conditions laid by Art. 113 from 
the Constitution, the content of a countersigned presidential decree. The President, even 
after the Prime Minister’s countersignature still holds a ”residual” political respon-
sibility, as well as the full administrative responsibility (or civil, criminal, accord-
ing to each case). Rejecting an exculpation decree by administrative courts cannot 
infringe on the Prime Minister, only on the President. The legislation on the adminis-
trative courts does not forbid challenging a presidential decree, nor does it contain 
any special references to such an action. Consequently, the Prime Minister cannot 
be sued, in principal or by an accessory demand, because there are no legal 
grounds for such an action, and the whole juridical construct that lays at the basis 
of administrative norms contains mechanisms through which the citizen is guaran-
teed protection only from the delivering administrative authority. 
The President’s decrees for which an obligation exists for countersignature 
have been qualified in the literature as ”complex administrative acts”1, as they ap-
pear following an expression of will of two public authorities. This category of 
administrative acts has an autonomous existence and in particular the decrees that 
require the Prime Minister’s counter-signature cannot be assimilated to any other 
category of administrative acts. It would be helpful that this category be expressly 
mentioned in a future Code for administrative procedure. Unfortunately, the cur-
rent draft of such a Code2 makes no clear reference to this distinct category of ad-
ministrative acts in connection with which, as we have seen, the regime of 
administrative responsibility is different. 
To the previous theoretical considerations must be added a picture of the cur-
rent situation relevant to the purpose of this article. On December 15th 2004 the act-
ing President at that moment, Ion Iliescu, in the final days of his constitutional 
mandate issued a decree of exculpation for 35 persons, among which stood Miron 
Cozma and others convicted for serious acts of corruption. The decree was affected 
by major flaws that will be subsequently presented. The rejection reaction of this 
decree coming from the civil society was prompt and a general mobilisation 
against its application ensued. It must also be stressed that the decree was issued 
in a time when the negotiations among parties for a future majority in the Parlia-
ment were only at the beginning, and its issuing undoubtedly had a strong influ-
ence on the reorientation of political alliances. On December 17th 2004 the President 
issued the following press release: 
”Following the consultations between the President of Romania, mister 
Ion Iliescu, and the Prime Minister, mister Adrian Năstase – taking into 
                                                
1 Tudor DRĂGANU, Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice, cit., p. 275. 
2 Ministry for Administration and Interior, National Institute for Administration, Regional 
Centre for Continual Development for Local Public Administration Sibiu, Code for administrative 
procedure of Romania (draft). 
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consideration the observations of the Ministry of Justice, as well as the reac-
tions of the public opinion – the President of Romania, mister Ion Iliescu, 
has decided the annulment of Decree no. 1164 from December 15th 2004, con-
cerning the granting of individual exculpations”. 
Previously, on the same day, the Presidency issued another press release in 
which it was stated that the ways through which the annulment of the above-men-
tioned decree were being analysed at the institutional level, and that a decision 
would follow based on the constitution. On the same date the President decided to 
revoke Decree no. 1164/2004 by Decree no. 1173/20041. This latter decree makes 
only one reference to the reasons why Decree no. 1164/2004 was revoked. The 
President wished that the legal effects of the decree that granted individual excul-
pation would not take place and it is obvious that discussions took place concern-
ing the language in which it should be written besides the revoking there was also 
the option of annulment that had been taken into consideration. 
The decision to revoke Decree no. 1164/2004 had an enormous impact on the 
public opinion. This time it was debated whether the President can or cannot re-
voke its own decrees. 
In analysing whether, from a constitutional point of view and in what concerns 
legal norms that apply in this case, the President’s decrees can or cannot be revoked 
one must also consider the fact that President Ion Iliescu was not, in December 2004, 
at his first operation of revoking his decrees of exculpation. Thus, on December 30th 
2001, the President issued Decree no. 1101/20012, which exculpated from impris-
onment several convicts, as well as exculpating from the rest of imprisonment time 
those who had been already punished. On January 7th 2002 the President issued De-
cree no. 1/20023, which revoked the individual exculpation of one of the convicts. 
Decree no. 1101/2001 continued thus to produce effects with respect to the other 
beneficiaries of presidential compassion. Since the names of the people included in 
Decree no. 1101/2001 were less well-known than those that were included in De-
cree no. 1164/2004, and the political climate was less tensed, the contradictory 
measures adopted by the President in December 2001 and January 2002, respec-
tively, were not subjected to a debate by the public opinion, the two decrees not be-
ing even mentioned in the public law literature. We consider that a general, 
theoretic discussion would have been fruitful at the time, especially in what con-
cerns the revoking of presidential decrees, as the conclusions such a discussion 
might have reached could have served well in the moment when, at the end of 2004, 
the problem that was not carefully considered when it should, surfaced again. 
Following the issuing of the two decrees of 2001 and 2002 a special law was 
adopted in the field of exculpation granted by the Romanian President, Law 
no. 546/2002 concerning the exculpation and the procedure for individual excul-
pation4, which in its turn was not subjected to a doctrinaire debate. We consider 
that, following the events from the end of 2004, a serious discussion is needed con-
cerning this law which should be modified and even more so, rigorously applied. 
Law no. 546/2002 mentions two types of exculpation: individual and collec-
tive. It contains some rules that an exculpation request must fulfil. It mentions 
                                                
1 Monitorul Oficial, no. 1219 from December 17th 2004. 
2 Monitorul Oficial, no. 844 from December 28th 2001. 
3 Monitorul Oficial, no. 5 from January 8th 2002. 
4 Monitorul Oficial, no. 755 from October 16th 2002. 
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identification data of the convicted person and the penalty for which the exculpa-
tion is requested, and attached to this request must be the final decission of con-
viction, the police records, marital documents, medical certificates, social inquiry 
reports, and other documentation the solicitor deems necessary in support of his 
request (Art. 5). The President may require in support of his exculpation preroga-
tive an advisory opinion from the Ministry of Justice (Art. 6). In the situation 
when the two exculpation decrees were issued on December 2004, the President 
did not exercise this prerogative. Given the large number of persons who were the 
subjects of the decrees, as well as the social menace these persons presented for 
the society, the President should have asked for the advisory opinion mentioned 
by Law no. 546/2002. De lege ferenda, a transformation should occur in what con-
cerns this presidential prerogative, it should no longer be optional, but rather 
compulsory, in order to avoid any suspicions related to the discretionary charac-
ter of the exculpation. 
The above-mentioned Law details in Art. 8 what elements should an exculpa-
tion decree enclose. In our opinion, the lack of any such element enclosed to the 
exculpation decree published in Monitorul Oficial is a good-enough reason for re-
questing the annulment of the act in an administrative court. 
This law does not tough upon the issue of revoking (or, depending on the 
terminology, annulment or retraction) exculpation decrees issued by the President. 
De lege ferenda, the legal authority should assert whether this complex administra-
tive act conforms to the legal regime commonly applicable to all other administra-
tive acts. Likewise, should the President be granted expressis verbis the prerogative 
to modify the legal effects of his own exculpation decrees, than it should be stated 
the limit up to which this prerogative can be dully exercised. 
It is necessary to clarify this issue so that the decisions the President takes con-
cerning the exculpation concord with the legal provisions. For the time being, the 
public law literature did not look upon the issue of revoking the exculpation de-
crees as a distinct subject, yet some doctrinaire considerations in the field can be 
employed in what concerns the revoking of administrative acts. 
Thus, Rodica Narcisa Petrescu, starting from the observation that there is no 
[legal] text that contains a clear account of how to revoke an administrative act, it 
cannot be contested, and so ”it spawned as a principle, which was determined by 
the specificity of the organisational activity and the concrete application of legal 
provisions, by means of administrative acts with unilateral character”1. The princi-
ple of revoking administrative acts has, according to the author, an absolute char-
acter in what concerns normative administrative acts. However, in what concerns 
individual administrative acts it ceases to be absolute. Some administrative acts, 
under situations explicitly described by the law or as effects of the nature of rights 
and obligations that establish themselves as part of the content, are irrevocable2. 
Rodica Narcisa Petrescu identifies four exceptions from the principle of irrevoca-
bility of administrative acts, among which ”administrative acts that materialised”3. 
Verginia Verdinaş considers that revoking administrative acts is a legal opera-
tion that might consist of retraction (when the issuing organ does the dismissal of 
the act) or of revoking (when a hierarchically superior authority does the dismissal 
                                                
1 Rodica Narcisa PETRESCU, Drept administrativ, Accent, Cluj-Napoca, 2004, p. 325. 
2 Ibidem, p. 327.  
3 Ibidem, p. 329.  
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of the act)1. The distinction made by this author is very useful, and agreeing with it 
involves the clarification of the operation through which the President intends to 
annul the effects of an exculpation decree in the category of retraction. Verginia 
Verdinaş takes for granted the opinion expressed by the literature according to 
which there is a principle for revoking administrative acts and enumerates six 
categories of acts that constitute themselves as exceptions from this principle. 
Among these are the administrative acts materially executed which, according to 
the author, are exempted ”on grounds of material effects, economic [ones] that 
they produced, and by the inefficiency a revoking act might have under conditions 
in which the material accomplishment of the act has been realised”2. Verginia Ver-
dinaş undertakes a special analysis of the President’s decrees, explaining how ad-
ministrative courts can check them on legal grounds3, except some categories of 
acts (which do not include exculpation decrees among them). 
Antonie Iorgovan assess in his turn that revoking is ”a principle of the legal 
regime of administrative acts”4. The author recognises that this principle is not en-
dorsed by a text with legal value and suggests it should be included in a future 
Code of administrative procedure. Antonie Iorgovan expresses six exceptions from 
the principle of revoking administrative acts, among which are the ”materially ac-
complished” acts. The author does not employ as examples the exculpation de-
crees, but rather the authorisations. Thus, issuing an authorisation for construction 
is meant to give the beneficiary the possibility to undertake certain material opera-
tions. Once the construction of the building is completed, revoking the administra-
tive act possesses no interest and cannot lead to any legal effect5, and the situation 
at hand (the existence of a building) cannot be undone by revoking the act. 
The thoroughest explanation in the literature concerning the revoking of ad-
ministrative acts can be found in Tudor Drăganu, Actele de drept administrativ6. It is 
not the purpose of this article to settle the dispute present in Romanian administra-
tive Law linked to the usage of the most appropriate terminology and to the choice 
of the category of either administrative acts or acts of administrative Law. In any 
case, it must be mentioned that the author himself currently uses the existing ter-
minology, i.e. administrative acts7. Although the quoted work dates from 1959, 
Tudor Drăganu’s considerations in the matter of revoking administrative acts still 
hold truth today, without being conditioned by the existing legislation at that time. 
These acts, according to the author, are revocable; still this principle ceases to be 
absolute in the case of individual acts (such as the case with exculpation decrees). 
Tudor Drăganu considers that exceptions to the principle of acts revocability find 
justification in the fact that ”it is necessary to assure certain stability for the citi-
zens”8. In other words, revoking of acts is a deflection from the established legal 
administrative order which, in order not to disturb the stability, is admitted under 
restrictive conditions. This is why the exceptions from the principle of revoking 
                                                
1 Virginia VERDINAŞ, op. cit., p. 112.  
2 Ibidem, p. 115.  
3 Ibidem, p. 274.  
4 Antonie IORGOVAN, op. cit., vol. II, p. 81.  
5 Ibidem, p. 90.  
6 Editura Ştiinţifică, Bucureşti, 1959. 
7 See Tudor DRĂGANU, ”Câteva reflecţii pe marginea recentului Proiect de Lege a conten-
ciosului administrativ”, in Revista de drept public, nr. 3/2004. 
8 IDEM, Actele de drept administrativ, cit., p. 202. 
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administrative acts must be stated in a limitative enumeration and restrictively in-
terpreted, taking into account, we might add, the general principle of law accord-
ing to which exceptions are meant for a strict interpretation. 
When an administrative authority revokes its own act it leads to a breech in 
legality1, and the victim ”may use all means of attack available to the citizens in 
our legislation”2. Among the exceptions to the principle of revoking administrative 
acts Tudor Drăganu lists those acts that have been materially accomplished. The 
author employs the same example as Antonie Iorgovan, the one with construction 
authorisation, which comes to show the source of inspiration for the latter author 
(actually, admitted as such). 
We consider that Decree no. 1164/2004 issued by the President of Romania falls into 
the category of administrative acts that have been materially accomplished and which, as a 
consequence, cannot be revoked. It so happens because, immediately after the publication of 
the decree in Monitorul Oficial, most of the persons directly touched by its provisions – 
the ones being convicted to imprisonment, because among the persons included into the de-
cree were some already released from prison – had been freed, this operation being undoubt-
edly a material accomplishment of the exculpation decree. Releasing from prison 
represents the most important, if not the only one, material accomplishment of ex-
culpation decree issued by the President of Romania. If we are to accept this con-
clusion, which conforms to the majority of viewpoints expressed in the literature 
with respect to the admitted exceptions to the principle of revoking administrative 
acts, Decree no. 1173/2004 cannot have legal effects, being issued in breach of general ad-
mitted principles of law. What is necessary is that these principles should be taken into 
consideration when concluding the draft Code of administrative procedure, as well as in 
what concerns a possible modification of Law no. 546/2002. 
The transgression of principle of law done by issuing Decree no. 1173/2002 
had consequences on the present legal order that cannot be properly assessed to 
their full extent. Thus, 18 out of the 35 exculpated persons have been taken back 
to prison following the revoking of Decree no. 1164/2004. Another 8 were already 
free, being released from prison prior to the issuing of the two presidential de-
crees, which reveals grave material errors within the text of Decree no. 1164/2004. 
Three of the convicted persons found of the list of exculpation have not been freed 
due to other material errors within Decree no. 1164/2004 – errors linked to their 
birth dates or the numbers of their court sentences, contrary to the dispositions of 
Art. 8, Law no. 546/20023. Unfortunately, this law makes no clarification about the 
legal consequences of the lack of compulsory elements that should be in the ex-
culpation decree or other material errors that affect these elements. A modifica-
tion of the Law no. 546/2002 should take into account these aspects and clearly 
state the consequence/consequences for issuing an exculpation decree that is in 
breach of legal provisions. 
The reading of Decree no. 1164/2004 and of Decree no. 1173/2004, as well as 
the analysis of the consequences these administrative acts have produced, should 
encourage the development of two hypotheses: 
                                                
1 Tudor DRĂGANU speaks of a breech of ”popular legality”, notion that is no longer in use 
today, explicable in the historical context when the work appeared.  
2 At that moment in time, challenging administrative acts in courts was not admitted by 
Romanian legislation.  
3 Data available in Ziua newspaper, from December 20th 2004.  
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a) Decree no. 1164/2004, having to withstand grave material errors, can be 
categorised as a non-existent administrative act. In general, it is being considered 
that these acts do not enjoy the assumption of legality and do not exist as such. It 
isn’t necessary for these acts to be declared void in order to deprive them of legal 
effects, but rather this observation can be made by anyone, because of their obvi-
ous faults1. If we accept this hypothesis then there was no need for revoking the 
decree in question. Such a hypothesis must take into account Art. 100 from the 
Constitution according to which the sanction in the case of a decree issued by the 
President of Romania unpublished in Monitorul Oficial is its non-existence. The 
Constitution makes no reference that the sanction of non-existence applies only in case of 
unpublished decrees the possibility exists for this sanction to be used in other cases of com-
parable gravity. Not publishing represents only an operation given as exempli gratia 
by the framers of the Constitution. 
b) The breaches that affect Decree no. 1164/2004 are not visible enough to justify 
the sanction of non-existence of that particular act. In this case, Decree no. 1164/2004 
may be challenged before an administrative court, with the possibility of being to-
tally or partially annulled, according to Art. 11 from Law no. 29/1990. 
Arguments can be developed in favour of each of the two hypotheses and 
only a court can appreciate the degree of gravity of the material errors that affect 
Decree no. 1164/2004. There is another hypothesis that deserves a separate discus-
sion. The question is to what extent the acting President of Romania may revoke a 
decree issued by the previous President. In this respect there can be no clear an-
swer, because there are no explicit provisions that Law no. 546/2002 should in-
clude. Until now, there has never been such a situation. In our opinion, in case a 
new President takes office, he can only revoke those decrees issued by the former President 
that have not been materially accomplished. It is obvious that both Decree no. 1164/2004, 
and Decree no. 1173/2004, can be considered without a doubt as acts that have been mate-
rially accomplished, which means that the acting President cannot revoke them. In the case 
of other decrees which have not been put to use, the solution of revoking even by 
another person that takes office as President of Romania following the constitu-
tional mandate of the one that issued them cannot be rejected de plano, conclusion 
drawn from the interpretation of the general legal principles. 
If we agree with the latter hypothesis Decree no. 1164/2004 may be challenged 
before an administrative court, according to Law no. 29/1990, by individuals who 
consider that their rights were damaged by the issuing of this administrative act. 
This conclusion follows from the interpretation of the above-mentioned law. It is 
also being illustrated by the literature – specifically by Verginia Verdinaş2 or Dana 
Apostol Tofan3; indirectly by Tudor Drăganu4 and Rodica Narcisa Petrescu5, by 
not mentioning it in the category of exceptions from the legal control instituted 
by Law no. 29/1990 or by Antonie Iorgovan, by not including President’s decrees 
in the category of acts that are considered as reasons for action dismissal6. The 
main competence to judge such an action, by which the annulment of the legal 
                                                
1 Tudor DRĂGANU, Actele de drept administrativ, cit., p. 152.  
2 Op. cit., p. 272.  
3 Op. cit., p. 137.  
4 Drept constituţional şi instituţii politice, cit., pp. 285-286. 
5 Op. cit., pp. 403-404. 
6 Antonie IORGOVAN, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 543-544. 
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consequences of Decree no. 1164/2004 is requested, falls, according to Law no. 29/1990, 
onto the Appeal Court of Bucharest1. 
We consider that a possible such action can be introduced following the men-
tioned rules and not by invoking Law no. 554/2004 on contentious business falling 
within the competence of the administrative courts2. This because the new Law on 
administrative courts entered into force, according to Art. 31 § 1, in 30 days from 
the publication date (December 7th 2004) and cannot produce retroactive effects, 
not being applicable to the two decrees issued by the President of Romania that 
were being extensively discussed in this article. 
It is interesting to notice that, had Law no. 554/2204 been adopted previous to 
the issuing of the decrees not only the injured parties from its dispositions (those 
subject to Decree no. 1164/2004) could have challenge it to the administrative 
court, but any other person who could prove a damage to personal rights or to le-
gitimate interest, because Art. 1 § 2 of the respective law states that ”it can address 
the administrative court also the person suffering an infringement against a per-
sonal right or a legitimate interest by an administrative act with individual charac-
ter, addressed to another legal subject”. Taking into account what was mentioned 
above, Law no. 554/2004 cannot be applied in the case of the two presidential de-
crees and, as a consequence, an action challenged before the administrative court by any 
other person, individual or legal, except those clearly refereed to by Decree no. 1164/2004, 
can only be dismissed on the grounds of lack of active judicial capacity. 
A final clarification to the above-mentioned conclusion is needed. Although 
the new Law on contentious business falling within the competence of the admin-
istrative courts could have been adopted before the issuing of the two presidential 
decrees and a possible action before court should have followed its provisions, the 
solution of challenging by other persons besides the one directly touched by De-
cree no. 1164/2004, would have been questionable. The reason is that, as revealed 
by the literature3, a popular action like the one envisaged by Law no. 554/2004 is 
contrary to Art. 21§ 1 from the Constitution, which states: ”Every person is entitled 
to bring cases before the courts for the defence of his legitimate rights, liberties and 
interests”, an opinion we share full-heartedly. Of course, as long as no court ruling 
observed the unconstitutionality of the respective provisions, any considerations 
remain strictly theoretical. 
                                                
1 For details concerning the material and territorial competence of courts that adjudicate 
requests formulated following Law no. 29/1990, see Dacian Cosmin DRAGOŞ, Procedura conten-
ciosului administrativ, All-Beck, Bucureşti, pp. 208-209.  
2 Monitorul Oficial, no. 1154 from December 7th 2004.  
3 Tudor DRĂGANU, ”Câteva reflecţii pe marginea recentului Proiect de Lege…cit.”, pp. 57-58. 
